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Cross-border acquisitions and financial leverage of UK 
acquirers 
 
ABSTRACT 
Based on a sample of 782 acquisitions by UK firms during 1982-2009, this paper examines the impact 
of cross-border acquisitions on financial leverage. The paper shows that cross-border acquisitions have 
a negative impact on the financial leverage of acquiring firms. However, the negative impact of cross-
border acquisitions disappears when acquirers choose targets from developed countries, and also when 
the acquisitions are undertaken by multinational firms. Collectively, the findings imply that exposure 
to foreign markets reduces the borrowing ability of acquiring firms especially when they choose 
targets from developing countries, and when they have no experience in foreign markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a tremendous growth in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) report that the share of cross-border acquisitions in the total 
volume of M&As increased from around 23% in 1998 to about 45% in 2007, and UK corporations 
have played a prominent role in this global trend. The UK alone accounted for 31% of worldwide 
cross-border M&As by the end of year 2000, making her the largest acquiring country globally 
(UNCTAD, 2000). Agyei-Boapeah (2014) shows that a salient feature of recent M&As in the UK is 
the growing importance of cross-border acquisitions. He reports that during the period 2002-2011, 
while the value of domestic acquisitions by UK firms declined by about 70% (i.e. from £25.2 billion in 
2002 to £7.6 billion in 2011), there was a surge in the value of cross-border acquisitions from £26.6 
billion in 2002 to £50.8 billion in 2011, representing an increase of over 90%.  
These developments perhaps explain why cross-border acquisitions, particularly those undertaken 
by UK acquiring firms have received more attention in the finance literature over recent years (e.g. 
Conn, Cosh, Guest, and Hughes, 2005; and Stiebale and Trax, 2011). These studies, however, often 
focus on the performance impact of cross-border acquisitions without considering how these 
international deals may impact the acquirerV¶ILQDQFLDOVWUXFWXUHVThis is an important gap in the 
existing literature because Nurnberg (2006) notes that business acquisitions (including cross-border 
acquisitions) PD\GLUHFWO\LPSDFWILUPV¶financing activities shown on the Statement of Cash Flows. 
This paper bridges this gap by empirically examining the impact of cross-border acquisitions on 
DFTXLULQJILUPV¶financial leverage (i.e. gearing ratio), as well as analysing the moderating impact of 
two variables (i.e. the status of the target country and the foreign market experience of the acquiring 
firm) on the link between cross-border acquisitions and leverage. Figure 1 below presents the 
conceptual framework for this study.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Based on the literature about foreign direct investment and international business, this paper 
establishes a link between cross-border acquisitions and corporate financial leverage. Specifically, the 
paper argues that since cross-border acquisitions represent an important mode of foreign market entry, 
they may expose the acquiring firm to some opportunities/costs that could either enhance or impede 
3 
 
the acquiring ILUPV¶ERUURZLQJDELOLW\ For example, cross-border acquisitions may enable acquiring 
firms to expand into new geographic locations and to obtain strategic assets, advanced technologies, 
and new skills that could ultimately result in competitive advantages to the firm (see Nocke and 
Yeaple, 2007; Seth, Song, and Pettit, 2002; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, and Pisano, 2004; Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004). 6XFKFRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHVFRXOGUHGXFHWKHDFTXLULQJILUP¶VEDnkruptcy risk, which 
could, in turn, enhance their borrowing ability and debt usage. However, when firms expand into new 
foreign markets, they may face additional risks/costs such as political and exchange rate risks and 
higher agency costs which could make it difficult for them to obtain debt capital (see Burgman, 1996; 
Reeb, Kwok, and Baek, 1998; Kwok and Reeb, 2000; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). Ultimately, the issue 
of the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the debt levels of acquiring firms becomes an empirical 
matter to be settled by empirical research. 
The present study relates to, but also differs in a number of ways from existing empirical studies 
on the link between internationalisation and leverage (e.g. Burgman, 1996; Kwok and Reeb, 2000; 
Mansi and Reeb, 2002). First, the empirical design utilised in prior studies has been primarily based on 
the analysis of existing multinational corporations (MNCs) and domestic corporations (DCs). This 
approach relies on segmental data in databases to construct proxy variables for firms¶ degree of 
internationalisation. However, some concerns have been raised about the validity of the 
internationalisation proxies that are constructed from segmental data (see Sullivan, 1994; Ramaswamy 
et al., 1996; Chen et al., 1997). For instance, the definition of a geographic segment adopted by both 
previous and current accounting standards on segment reporting (see IAS 14, paragraph 35 and IFRS 
8, paragraph 13) could imply that international firms with foreign assets or sales of less than 10% may 
be classified as domestic firms. Unlike prior studies, the present article investigates the relationship 
between internationalisation and leverage without reference to segmental data. Specifically, the 
internationalisation-leverage link is examined by directly modelling the change in financial leverage 
following a corporate action (cross-border acquisitions) that increases the firms¶ international 
activities. Using such an approach, this paper circumvents the issue of which internationalisation 
proxies to use and their associated limitations.  
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Second, the present investigation differs from the previous studies by focusing on how a specific 
mode of entry into foreign markets (i.e. cross-border acquisitions) may impact ILUPV¶Oeverage. This 
distinction is important because Shimizu et al. (2004) argue that while internationalisation can be 
achieved in a variety of ways (e.g. cross-border acquisitions, exports, formation of alliances and joint 
ventures), the risks/costs associated with the equity entry modes (cross-border acquisitions, and 
greenfield investments) far outweigh those of the non-equity entry modes (e.g. exports, formation of 
alliances, etc.). Specifically, it is likely that political risks (and thus, bankruptcy risks) and the agency 
costs of debt (e.g. monitoring cost by lenders) will be greater for firms that become international 
through the purchase of existing assets/firms in other countries, compared to those international firms 
that merely export to foreign countries. This is because while exporting firms may have little or no 
tangible assets in host countries, cross-border acquiring firms do establish a physical presence in host 
countries, which makes their foreign tangible assets easy targets for expropriation by host 
governments (Burgman, 1996). In addition, the potential for fraud is greater among foreign 
subsidiaries because of the large distance between them and their parent, thus, increasing the risk 
associated with cross-border acquisitions.1 Within this context, it is plausible for the link between 
internationalisation and leverage to vary for the various modes of entering foreign markets, since 
corporate risks and agency costs are important determinants of financial leverage (Castanias, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Despite the differences in the equity and non-equity modes of foreign market entry, empirical 
studies so far have failed to account for the mode of entry in their analyses, and this perhaps, together 
with the absence of a valid proxy for internationalisation, partly contributes to the conflicting 
empirical findings in the literature. For example, Mansi and Reeb (2002) document a positive 
relationship between internationalisation and leverage whereas Burgman (1996) finds 
internationalisation to be negatively related to leverage. As a first step towards recognising the 
potential role of the mode of entry into foreign markets, this paper contributes to the literature by 
specifically examining the impact of cross-border acquisitions on corporate leverage. Moreover, to 
date, most of the existing literature on the internationalisation-leverage link has been conducted in the 
                                                          
1
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this argument. 
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US context. The extent to which the explanations offered in the US context hold in other countries 
remains largely unexplored, and the current paper seeks to fill this gap by conducting an empirical 
analysis within a UK context where cross-border acquisitions are numerous.   
Another important contribution of this study is its test of whether the level of economic 
development of the target (host) nation influences the impact of cross-border acquisitions on leverage. 
This line of inquiry is motivated by the notion that some foreign markets may be associated with 
higher or lower opportunities/challenges than others because the advanced technologies and skills as 
well as the risks (exchange rate and political) and agency costs of debt are not symmetric across host 
countries (Kwok and Reeb, 2000; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). Accordingly, this paper distinguishes 
between the cross-border acquisitions effect on the leverage of those firms that acquire targets from 
advanced countries, and those acquiring firms with targets from developing countries. 2  
Finally, the paper considers how the cross-border leverage effect may vary between multinational 
and domestic corporations that undertake acquisitions. This paper argues that since multinational 
corporations already have some foreign market experience, they may be in a better position to manage 
the additional opportunities and/or risks/costs associated with internationalisation (Davidson, 1983). 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the moderating or enhancing role of 
ILUPV¶foreign market experience on the internationalisation-leverage link. 
The results, based on a sample of 782 acquisitions, suggest that acquiring firms, on average, do 
experience significant declines in their financial leverage following cross-border acquisitions. 
However, the negative impact of cross-border acquisitions on leverage is restricted to: (1) acquiring 
firms that have target firms from developing countries, and (2) acquiring firms without any experience 
in foreign markets. Collectively, these findings imply that the less stable economic environment 
prevailing in some host countries and the lack of foreign market experience tend to negatively impact 
on the borrowing ability of cross-border acquirers.  
                                                          
2
 In this paper, advanced and developing countries are defined according to classifications by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF, World Economic Outlook, April, 2011, p.150). However, it should be noted that those 
countries classified as emerging by the IMF are considered as part of developing countries in this paper. See link 
below: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf  
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
specifies the hypotheses of the study. Data and analytical methods are then presented, after which the 
results are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions and implications RIWKHVWXG\¶VILQGLQJVare 
discussed.  
    
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Capital structure 
Prior to establishing the link between cross-border acquisitions and firms¶ leverage, the literature 
on capital structure is briefly reviewed in order to highlight the primary determinants of the amount of 
GHEWLQDILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH.  
The extant academic literature on capital structure suggests that in an imperfect capital market, the 
DPRXQWRIGHEWLQDILUP¶VWRWDOFDSLWDO represents an important means by which value is created for 
shareholders, and this perhaps explains why various studies have attempted to investigate the 
determinants of corporate leverage (e.g. Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977; Castanias, 1983; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ghosh and Jain, 
2000; Agyei-Boapeah, 2014). Most of these studies highlight bankruptcy risks (and its related cost of 
financial distress), agency costs, and information asymmetry as being among the major factors that 
influence corporate leverage. For instance, Castanias (1983) reports that industries with high failure 
rates tend to have lower leverage which suggests that lenders shy away from risky firms and 
industries. Similarly, various studies document relatively robust evidence that leverage ratios are 
negatively associated with bankruptcy risks/costs (see Castanias, 1983; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Uysal, 2011; Agyei-Boapeah, 2014). 
Another well-documented determinant of corporate leverage is agency costs of debt (see Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Burgman, 1996; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). Agency cost of debt 
arises because the conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders tend to result in sub-optimal 
investment decisions by the firm which may be detrimental to lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Myers, 1977). Therefore, lenders need to incur additional costs (e.g. monitoring and bonding costs) in 
order to protect their interest in the firm. These additional costs (agency costs of debt) generally tend 
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to lead to lower leverage ratios for firms with higher agency costs (see Myers, 1977; Burgman, 1996; 
Mittoo and Zhang, 2008).  
Finally, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) point out asymmetric information costs as 
being specific forms of agency costs that influence corporate leverage. They argue that asymmetric 
information costs arise because managers generally have more information about the value of their 
firms than investors, thus, investors consider issues of external securities (debt and equity) as a signal 
that a firm is overvalued. This belief makes investors react negatively to external security issues 
(including debt issues), thus, increasing the cost of external capital. Therefore, higher levels of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors may lead to higher costs of external capital 
(e.g. debt) and lower leverage (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).  
Taken together, the literature on capital structure suggests that leverage ratios are negatively 
UHODWHGWRWKHILUPV¶OHYHOVRIEDQNUXSWF\Uisks, agency costs, and asymmetric information costs. Based 
on this conclusion, the next subsection draws a link between cross-border acquisitions and corporate 
financial leverage by suggesting that cross-border acquisitions (i.e. increasing levels of 
internationalisation) may increase or decrease these costs of debt, and thus, influence the leverage of 
acquiring firms.    
 
2.2 The potential link between cross-border acquisitions and leverage 
The link between cross-ERUGHUDFTXLVLWLRQVDQGDFTXLULQJILUPV¶ILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHLVSULPDULO\
based on the suggestion that cross-ERUGHUDFTXLVLWLRQVPD\LQFUHDVHWKHILUPV¶OHYHOVRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
activity. As noted earlier, cross-border acquisitions represent one of the key ways by which firms enter 
foreign markets (see Nocke and Yeaple, 2008; Seth et al., 2002; Shimizu, et al., 2004; Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004). Thus, firms that undertake cross-border acquisitions may be expected to experience a 
rise in their levels of international operations.  
Through cross-border acquisitions, firms can obtain access to existing products that are proven 
and tested in foreign markets as well as obtain access to an existing network of customers and 
suppliers (Shimizu et al., 2004; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). In addition, cross-border acquisitions offer 
access to complementary firm-specific assets and capabilities (e.g. skills, knowledge, technology, etc.) 
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that are non-mobile across borders and markets (Nocke and Yeaple, 2008; Stiebale and Trax, 2011). 
These benefits can result in competitive advantages (Khallaf, 2012) which may reduce the bankruptcy 
risk of cross-border acquiring firms. It has also been suggested that international diversification (cross-
border acquisitions) may lead to lower earnings volatility as international firms are able to receive 
cash flows from imperfectly correlated foreign markets, which then lead to a lower cost of borrowing 
for them (e.g. Hughes et al., 1975; Fatemi, 1984; Reeb et al., 2001). Overall, these arguments suggest 
that cross-border acquisitions should enhance the borrowing ability of cross-border acquirers by 
reducing their bankruptcy risks.  
However, contrary views have been expressed in the international business literature (see Lee, 
1986; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996; Reeb et al., 1998; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008). Studies from 
this literature suggest that firms with foreign operations tend to have higher bankruptcy risks as well as 
higher agency and information asymmetry costs, which in turn, reduce their debt levels. Although 
these studies are not specifically about cross-border acquisitions, their arguments about general 
international business may be relevant for cross-border acquisitions. For instance, Reeb et al. (1998) 
argue that compared to DCs, MNCs have higher foreign exchange risk because they are more exposed 
to foreign exchange fluctuations, which systematically increases the variations in their foreign returns 
in domestic currency. Burgman (1996) also notes that major political events such as currency blockage 
or expropriation make MNCs more risky. Furthermore, cross-border acquisitions may be associated 
with higher agency and information asymmetry costs because overseas targets are more difficult to 
monitor and to value accurately due to imperfect information (Conn et al., 2005), the language 
differences, and varying legal and accounting systems that prevail in different countries (Mittoo and 
Zhang, 2008). Consequently, cross-border acquisitions could result in reductions in the borrowing 
ability of acquiring firms. 
Collectively, the extant literature on foreign direct investment and international business suggests 
that cross-border acquisitions have the potential to influence the key underlying determinants of 
financial leverage ± bankruptcy risks, agency and asymmetric information costs ± although there 
seems to be no consensus on the direction of the impact of these international deals on corporate 
leverage. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is formulated for testing: 
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H1: Cross-ERUGHUDFTXLVLWLRQVOHDGWRLQFUHDVHVRUGHFUHDVHVLQDFTXLUHUV¶ILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJH 
 
2.3 The moderating effect of the status of the target country 
Since the impact of cross-border acquisitions on financial leverage is primarily due to how the 
acquisition deals influence firms¶ bankruptcy risks (via competitive advantage or foreign exchange 
and political risks) and agency as well as information asymmetry costs, this paper argues that there 
should be systematic cross-sectional variations among acquiring firms that pursue target firms from 
developed markets and those acquirers with targets from developing countries. Due to the higher 
information disclosure, the greater contract enforcements, the superior technology, and the lesser 
political risks that are likely to be associated with advanced economies (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Kwok and Reeb, 2000), it is plausible to expect lower agency and 
information asymmetry costs and bankruptcy risks when acquisition targets are from advanced 
countries than when they are from developing countries. On the basis of this argument, Hypothesis 2 is 
formulated as follows: 
H2: The FKDQJHLQDFTXLULQJILUP¶VILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHIROORZLQJcross-border acquisitions 
would differ between acquisition deals involving targets from developed countries and those 
from developing countries. 
 
2.4 The moderating effect of foreign market experience 
It is widely acknowledged that the benefits of cross-border acquisitions may not be realised when 
the post-merger processes (e.g. acculturation and integration) are not effectively managed (Conn et al., 
2005). Therefore, the ability of acquiring firms to manage the post-merger processes may determine 
whether or not they achieve any competitive advantages and the associated reduction in bankruptcy 
risks. This paper argues that since DQDFTXLULQJILUP¶VOHYHORIH[SHULHQFHLQIRUHLJQPDUNHWRSHUDWLons 
may be related to its ability to manage subsequent cross-border acquisitions, it is likely that there will 
be important cross-sectional variations between the cross-border leverage effect for firms with 
experience in foreign market operations (i.e. existing multinational firms) and those without any 
foreign market experience (i.e. existing domestic firms).  
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In fact, prior studies suggest that experience in foreign markets is crucial in dealing with the 
uncertainties associated with international operations (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Davidson, 
1980; 1983; Erramilli, 1991). With increasing experience, firms acquire knowledge of foreign 
markets, which makes them more confident in their ability to correctly estimate risks and return and 
manage foreign operations (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Davidson. 1982). Thus, even if cross-border 
acquisitions result in increased bankruptcy risks, it is possible that experienced firms may use their 
prior foreign market knowledge acquired over a number of years to develop and implement effective 
risk management and control mechanisms to mitigate the increased risks associated with 
internationalisation. Moreover, it seems plausible that experienced firms will face lower information 
asymmetry and agency costs because lenders may already have some information about their previous 
foreign market operations which may reduce the uncertainty about their new foreign market 
operations. The above discussions lead to the final hypothesis below: 
H3: The FKDQJHLQDFTXLULQJILUP¶VILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHIROORZLQJcross-border acquisitions 
would differ between firms with experience in foreign markets (MNCs) and those without any 
foreign market experience (DCs).  
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Estimation method 
In this paper, financial leverage (market leverage) for firm i in year t is measured as the ratio of 
total debt to total capital (i.e. sum of total debt and market value of equity) (see Antoniou, Guney, and 
Paudyal, 2008; Mittoo and Zhang, 2008; Agyei-Boapeah, 2014)3. This paper uses market leverage for 
its analysis because it is forward-ORRNLQJPRUH³REMHFWLYH´DQGRIWHQIDYRXUHGLQFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH
research (see Morellec and Zhdanov, 2008, p.578). Moreover, most of the theoretical predictions about 
capital structure are concerned with the market value of the firm (see Modigliani and Miller, 1963; 
Myers, 1977), but not the book value of the firm.  
                                                          
3
 For robustness, the book leverage measure is also utilized, though these results are not reported in order to 
conserve space. The book leverage measure follows the market leverage definition, except that the market value 
of equity is substituted with the book value of equity. Results based on both measures were qualitatively similar. 
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7KHSULPDU\REMHFWLYHRIWKLVSDSHULVWRH[DPLQHZKHWKHUDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRXndertake cross-
border acquisitions (i.e. increase its level of internationalization) in year t has a significant impact on 
its financial leverage in year t+1. To empirically undertake this analysis, one must determine whether 
the observed post-acquisition leverage ratios for cross-border acquirers are significantly higher or 
lower than what they would have been if these firms had not engaged in cross-border acquisitions. 
However, the latter outcome is unobservable. A possible analysis would be to compare the leverage 
ratios of cross-border acquirers with those of non-acquiring firms. The problem with this form of 
analysis is that firms select themselves into the different groups (acquirers vs. non-acquirers) based on 
characteristics that might also influence the observed outcome. Within the context of this paper, it may 
be the case that firms with lower leverage are more likely to engage in acquisitions because they are 
able to borrow at favourable costs (e.g. Bruner, 1988; Morellec and Zhdanov, 2008). Thus, results 
based on a comparison between acquirers and non-acquirers are likely to suffer from selection bias. 
To minimise this potential selection bias, the current paper selects a control sample of acquirers 
rather than non-acquirers. Since the primary focus is to investigate the impact of increasing 
internationalisation (via cross-border acquisitions) on cross-ERUGHUDFTXLUHUV¶OHYHUDJHUDWLRVGRPHVWLF
acquirers are relied upon to serve as a control group. Specifically, the sample firms (to be discussed in 
section 3.2) that engaged in domestic acquisitions during the sample period (i.e. 1982-2009) served as 
the control sample for the firms that engaged in cross-border acquisitions (i.e. the main sample). It is 
important to note that since the empirical (multivariate) models (to be discussed later) utilised in the 
current article directly control for firm size and industry, the control firms are not matched by size 
and/or industry4.  
The goal for using domestic acquirers as a control group is to construct a control group of firms 
that are also active in the market for corporate control, except that their acquisition activities did not 
lead to increases in the level of internationalisDWLRQ6LQFHILUPV¶IRUHLJQRSHUDWions may increase 
                                                          
4
 The size and industry differences between the main sample (cross-border acquirers) and the control sample 
(domestic acquirers) and their effect on the leverage of the firms can be dealt with by either (a) constructing a 
size-and-industry-matched control sample; or (b) directly controlling for firm size and industry in a multivariate 
framework. The current article chose the latter approach because it has two main advantages: (1) it helps to 
directly observe/quantify the size and industry effect on leverage; and (2) it increases the explanatory power of 
the leverage (regression) model.  
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when they undertake cross-border acquisitions but are likely to remain unchanged in domestic 
acquisitions5, the post-acquisition leverage of domestic acquirers could provide a reasonable proxy for 
the expected post-acquisition leverage of cross-border acquirers had their decisions not increased their 
foreign operations. Thus, the results on the cross-border acquisition effect on leverage could be 
LQWHUSUHWHGLQUHODWLRQVWRILUPV¶DFWLRQVDFTXLVLWLRQVZKLFKGLGQRWLQFrease their foreign operations. 
The sample of cross-border acquirers and the control sample of domestic acquirers are then used 
to implement the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator in a multivariate regression framework. 
This approach basically compares the difference in the financial leverage for cross-border acquirers 
with that of domestic acquirers while controlling for the other determinants of capital structure (e.g. 
firm size, industry, etc.). Specifically, the DID estimation model below, Eq. (1), is the baseline model 
used for the empirical analyses. The parameters of the model are estimated using the Random-effects 
Generalised Least Squares (GLS) panel estimation procedure. 
ititittiit XPostCBPostCBLeverage HEEEEE  54321 )*(    Eq. (1) 
In Eq. (1) above, 1E  is the intercept, CB is the cross-border dummy which is equal to one if the 
observed firm is a cross-border acquirer, and zero for the control group of firms (domestic acquirers). 
The CB dummy ( 2E ) is expected to capture the general differences in financial leverage which 
emanate from the inherent differences between cross-border acquirers and the control firms. It may be 
the case that there is a systematic difference in the leverage ratios of firms that undertake cross-border 
acquisitions and the control group of firms. Thus, 2E should capture the impact of such differences in 
the two sample groups on leverage.  
Post, in Eq. (1) above, is the post-acquisition dummy which is equal to one (zero) if the 
observation is for the year t+1 (year t-1). This variable (and its parameter estimate, 3E ) should capture 
the general changes in leverage over the pre-and post-acquisition periods (i.e. from t-1 to t+1). The 
inclusion of the variable reflects the fact that leverage ratios may change for most firms (whether or 
                                                          
5
 In unreported results, thiVSDSHUILQGVWKDWILUPV¶OHYHOV of internationalisation (as measured by their foreign 
assets ratio) significantly increase by about 11 percentage points following cross-border acquisitions. However, 
there is no statistically significant change in the levels of internationalisation when firms undertake domestic 
acquisitions. These results are available upon request.  
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not they engaged in cross-border acquisitions) during some periods due to general economic 
conditions (e.g. low interest rates). Indeed, acquisitions may be more likely in periods of credit 
availability and high stock market performance which make it easier for firms to obtain funding for 
their investments (Uysal, 2011, Agyei-Boapeah, 2014). So, it is possible for firms, in general, to 
experience changes in their leverage ratios during periods of high acquisition activity. Bruner (1988) 
and Ghosh and Jain (2000) provide empirical evidence to suggest that corporate leverage, on average, 
increases following acquisitions. Their findings imply that, at least, some acquirers may borrow in the 
pre-acquisition period and use the new debt to fund their acquisitions. This then results in higher post-
acquisition leverage for acquirers. Therefore, the inclusion of 3E in Eq. (1) helps to control for the 
macro-economic conditions (e.g. credit availability) that could induce changes in corporate leverage 
over the pre- and post-acquisition periods (i.e. t-1 and t+1).  
The main parameter of interest for the current article is 4E (i.e. the coefficient for the interaction 
dummy between CB and Post) since it represents the average cross-border impact on financial 
leverage. It ( 4E ) shows the change in corporate leverage which is solely due to the completion of a 
cross-border acquisition. It is, therefore, hoped that 4E UHIOHFWVWKHLPSDFWRQDILUP¶VOHYHUDJH
following a corporate activity which increases its levels of internationalisation. Consequently, a 
negative (positive) and significant coefficient estimate of 4E would be consistent with this paper¶V
primary hypothesis (H1), i.e., cross-border acquisitions reduce (increase) DFTXLUHUV¶leverage ratios. 
It is important to note that in testing Hypotheses 2 and 3, Eq. (1) is slightly modified by interacting 
4E  with dummies for the different types of acquirers that are of interest to this study. Therefore, the 
empirical analyses contained in the current paper are conducted using five related models. The first 
model is the baseline model in Eq. (1) above, while the remaining four models are variants of the Eq. 
(1). Specifically, the five empirical models utilized to address WKHVWXG\¶VK\SRWKHVHV are as follows:  
I. A model for all acquirers (i.e. the baseline model in Eq. (1) above) (H1) 
II. A model for acquirers with targets from developed countries (H2)  
III. A model for acquirers with targets from developing countries (H2) 
IV. A model for acquirers with prior foreign market experience (H3) 
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V. A model for acquirers without prior foreign market experience (H3) 
In order to reduce the residual variance of the above models, a vector of control variables (X) is 
included in all the five analyses. The choice of these variables was guided by the literature on capital 
structure (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Myers, 1977; Antoniou et al., 2008; Agyei-Boapeah, 2014). 
First, the ratio of accumulated depreciation to total assets is included to control for non-debt tax 
shelters since tax motivations do influence debt usage. Second, cash flow volatility is included to 
control for expected bankruptcy cost. This is defined as the standard deviation of cash flows divided 
by sales over the past three years. Third, the effect of growth opportunities (and agency costs) is 
controlled for using market-to-book ratio as a proxy. Firms with higher growth opportunities use less 
debt in order to gain investment flexibility (Myers, 1977). Fourth, asset tangibility is included to 
control for collateral since real assets are easier to sell in the event of default. This is measured as the 
ratio of net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. Fifth, the ratio of earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortizations to total assets is included to control for profitability since 
firms with high profitability tend to rely more (less) on internal funds (debt) (Myers, 1984). Sixth, firm 
size, defined as the natural log of total asset is included since large firms may find it easier to borrow. 
In addition, industry and year fixed effects are controlled for. Finally, the regression model contains 
the error term, itH .  
 
3.2 Data 
In order to examine the link between cross-border acquisitions and financial leverage, all 
completed (cross-border and domestic) acquisitions from 1982-2009 involving non-financial publicly 
listed UK acquiring firms were collected.6 Data on the dates of acquisitions, and acquirer as well as the 
WDUJHWILUPV¶KRPHFRXQWULHVDUHREWDLQHGIURP7KRPVRQ)LQDQFLDOV¶6HFXULWLHV'DWD&RPSDQ\¶V 
(SDC) Merger and Acquisitions database. It was decided to RQO\NHHSGHDOVIRUZKLFKDFTXLUHUV¶
SHUFHQWDJHRIRZQHUVKLSRIWDUJHWV¶HTXLW\DIWHUWKHDFTXLVLWLRQLVat least 50%. This is to ensure that 
                                                          
6
 Consistent with the tradition in capital structure research (e.g. Uysal, 2011; Agyei-Boapeah, 2014), financial 
firms (e.g. banks, insurance companies, etc.) are excluded from the study because they have special asset 
compositions and are also subject to stricter government regulations which make them different from other 
firms. 
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the sample reflects acquisitions for which the acquirer can significantly influence the coPELQHGILUP¶V
strategic financial decisions. In addition, acquisitions that are classified as leveraged buy-outs are 
dropped because these special deals are heavily debt-financed, and could thus, bias the results. There 
are 1,186 acquisition deals that meet these criteria.  
The relevant accounting data7 for acquiring firms had to be available in Datastream for two years 
(one year before, and one year after the acquisition). For example, if the effective date RIDILUP¶V
acquisition is in 2005 (year t), then for this deal to be included in the sample, relevant data for the firm 
had to be available for the years 2004 (t-1) and 2006 (t+1). This criterion resulted in a substantial 
reduction of the sample to 782 deals made by 558 UK firms. The final dataset utilised in the empirical 
analyses is obtained by constructing a 2-period panel dataset for the 782 acquiring firms. For each 
acquiring firm in year t, 2-years of observations are required in order to undertake the empirical 
analyses (i.e. t-1 and t+1). Thus, observing these 782 acquiring firms over a 2-year period produces 
observation units of 1,564 firm-years (i.e. 782 firms x 2 years = 1,564) which are used in the empirical 
analyses. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of acquisitions by target country, year of acquisition, and the type 
of acquirer (MNCs vs. DCs). A cross-border acquisition is defined to include deals in which the target 
country is different from the UK. Out of the 782 deals, 327 are cross-border and 455 are domestic. 
However, during the latter years (i.e. 2001-2009), cross-border deals out-numbered the domestic deals 
(136 vs. 110) which reflects the rising trend in cross-border acquisitions over recent years. Almost 
85% (15%) of the cross-border deals are made to developed (developing) countries. Nearly half (46%) 
of all cross-border deals had US targets. Conn et al. (2005) find a similar trend in their sample of UK 
acquirers. A possible explanation is the common language and traditions shared by the two nations, as 
well as the similarity in their legal (common law) and financial systems (market-based). Other 
countries where firms often become acquisition targets of UK companies are Canada, Australia, and 
                                                          
7
 That is, the data to calculate financial leverage and the control variables (e.g. firm size, profitability, risk, etc.) 
used in the regression model should be available. 
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South Africa. Again, these countries seem to share a common language and historical ties with the 
UK. 
When the deals are differentiated by the type of acquirer, 43% and 16% of the deals are made by 
MNCs and DCs, respectively. The remaining 41% had missing geographic segmental data on 
Datastream; thus, it was not possible to classify them. Firms are classified as MNCs if they have 
reported non-UK assets on Datastream, and as DCs if they have no foreign assets. In terms of the time 
period, over 77% of the deals were completed between 1991 and 2009, implying that the VWXG\¶V
results are more likely to reflect recent deals.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the study variables. The 
statistics for the leverage ratio (i.e. WKHVWXG\¶VGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVcomputed separately for the pre- 
and post-acquisition years (t-1 and t+1). However, in order to conserve space, the statistics for the 
remaining variables are based on a pooled observation from the pre- and post-acquisition years. 
According to the data, prior to acquisitions, the average firm LQWKHVWXG\¶VVDPSOHhas 16% debt in 
its total capital, but this ratio increases to about 24% immediately after the acquisition. This finding is 
consistent with prior studies which documented a general rise in leverage ratios subsequent to 
acquisitions (Bruner, 1988; Ghosh and Jain, 2000). Table 2 also suggests that the correlations between 
both the pre-and post-acquisition leverage and the control variables largely have the expected signs. 
Specifically, the leverage ratios are negatively correlated with risk, market-to-book ratio, and 
profitability; but positively correlated with firm size, and asset tangibility. Again, these relationships 
are in line with extant capital structure literature (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Antoniou et al., 2008; 
Agyei-Boapeah, 2014).  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
The next section utilises a multivariate regression framework to investigate the impact of cross-
border acquisitions (increasing levels of internationalisation) on the financial leverage of acquiring 
firms (H1) and the moderating effect on this relationship by the status of the target country (H2) and 
the foreign market experience of the acquirer (H3). 
 
4.2 The link between cross-border acquisitions and leverage (H1) 
Table 3 provides results that are based on the difference-in-differences (DID) estimation (in 
Eq. (1)) and highlights the cross-border impact on leverage, 4E , for all the five empirical models. 
Models I tests hypothesis 1 which posits that there should be a change in DFTXLUHUV¶OHYHUDJH
following cross-border acquisitions (increasing internationalisation). The results indicate that the 
impact of cross-ERUGHUDFTXLVLWLRQVRQDFTXLULQJILUPV¶GHEWXVDJHLVQHJDWLYHDQGweakly 
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significant ( 4E =-0.018, p=0.100). Thus, the evidence (though mild) suggests that cross-border 
acquisitions, on average, UHVXOWLQUHGXFWLRQVLQDFTXLUHUV¶OHYHUDJHDQGVHHPVWRVXSSRUWWKH
notion that increased levels of internationalisation leads to higher bankruptcy risks as well as 
agency and information asymmetry costs for international firms. This finding is in line with prior 
US studies reporting a negative association between debt ratios and internationalisation (e.g. Lee, 
1986; Burgman, 1996). 
 [INSERT TABLE 3] 
 
4.3 The moderating effect of the status of the target country (H2) 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the change in DFTXLUHUV¶ILQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHIROORZLQJ cross-border 
acquisitions should differ between acquisitions involving target firms from developed countries 
and those from developing countries. This hypothesis is tested by constructing dummy variables 
for deals involving targets from developed countries (e.g. US, Germany, France, etc.), on the one 
hand, and targets from developing countries (e.g. South Africa, India, Columbia, etc.), on the other 
hand (see Table 1 for the full list of countries). The dummy variables are then interacted with the 
average cross-border effect ( 4E ) in Eq. (1). Thus, the reported values of 4E in Models II and III of 
Table 3 reflect the interaction effect of the level of economic stability of the target country.  
According to the results in Model II, 4E is negative but statistically insignificant ( 4E =0.-003, 
p=0.775), suggesting that cross-border acquisitions by UK firms into developed countries have no 
significant impact on their financial leverage. However, as depicted in Model III, there is a 
negative and statistically significant impact of cross-border acquisitions on the leverage of 
acquiring firms that diversify into developing countries ( 4E =-0.049, p=0.012). These results 
support Hypothesis 2, and are generally consistent with the view that the less stable economic 
environments (e.g. higher exchange rate and political risks, less developed IT infrastructure and 
capital markets) that generally prevail in developing countries could make international firms that 
locate there less attractive to lenders (Kwok and Reeb, 2000). 
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4.4 The moderating effect of the DFTXLUHUV¶IRUHLJQPDUNHWH[SHULHQFH (H3) 
Results for the test of the final hypothesis are shown in Models IV and V of Table 3. 
Hypothesis 3 postulates that there is an asymmetric cross-border impact on the leverage of 
acquirers that have foreign market experience (i.e. multinational corporations, MNCs) and those 
without any foreign market experience (i.e. domestic corporations, DCs). In conducting this test, 
two separate dummies for MNCs and DCs are created, and these dummies are interacted with the 
average cross-border effect ( 4E ) in Eq. (1). 
The results indicate that while cross-border acquisitions have a negative but statistically 
insignificant impact on the leverage of MNCs (in Model IV, 4E =-0.014, p=0.216), they 
significantly reduce the leverage of DCs (in Model V, 4E =-0.075, p=0.007).8 These results 
support Hypothesis 3, and imply that MNCs rely on their foreign markets experience to reduce 
part of the additional complexities (risks and costs) associated with international business 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Davidson. 1982). Thus, lenders do not shy away from supplying debt 
capital to MNCs when they increase their levels of international activity. The results also suggest 
that the QHJDWLYHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQILUPV¶OHYHOs of international activity and leverage ratios may 
be influenced by those less experienced, new foreign markets entrants that do not have the know-
how in managing the increased risks/costs associated with foreign market operations. 
 
2.5 Other variables 
This section turns attention to the discussion of the other explanatory variables in the 
regression models. First, it seems that, besides the cross-border acquisition event (i.e. increasing 
                                                          
8
 As noted earlier, the definitions for MNCs and DCs are based on geographic segmental data. Since 
international accounting standards on segment reporting changed from IAS 14 to IFRS 8 with effect from 1st 
January, 2009, further tests were conducted to determine whether this regulatory change influenced the reported 
findings for H3. This was done by eliminating firms in year 2009 and repeating the empirical tests for only those 
sample firms that reported under IAS 14 (i.e. firms in 1982-2008). Also, in order not to include early adopters of 
IFRS 8 in the robustness tests, further tests that were restricted to sample firms in 1982-2007 were conducted. 
The cut-off date for this test was 2007 because IFRS 8 was issued on 30th November, 2006, and it is assumed 
that firms will need some time to study the new standard as well as alter their accounting systems to 
accommodate the standard. The results for both robustness tests (1982-2008 sample and 1982-2007 sample) 
were qualitative similar to those based on the full sample (1982-2009) that are reported in Models IV and V of 
Table 3. Thus, the results and conclusions of the current paper are robust to the change in the accounting 
regulation on segment reporting. To conserve space, the results for these robustness tests are not reported but are 
available upon request.  
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levels of internationalisation), those firms that engaged in cross-border acquisitions generally had 
lower leverage ratios relative to their counterparts that engaged in domestic acquisitions. This is 
because, as depicted in Table 3, the parameters for the cross-border dummies, 2E , are negative and 
mostly statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that cross-border acquisitions, on 
average, are larger than domestic acquisitions (see Agyei-Boapeah, 2014), thus, cross-border 
acquirers require more debt capacity to be able to complete these acquisitions.  
Second, 3E  (i.e. the parameter estimate for post-acquisition period) is positive and statistically 
significant throughout the models. This implies that acquisitions generally occur in periods of 
credit availability in the macro-economy which then leads to increased borrowing to undertake 
those investments. Thus, subsequent to acquisitions, firms on average, experience increases in 
their leverage ratios. This is consistent with the findings in Ghosh and Jain (2000) and Bruner 
(1988).  
Furthermore, as in prior studies (e.g. Mittoo and Zhang, 2008; Antoniou et al., 2008; Uysal, 
2011; Agyei-Boapeah, 2014), debt usage is negatively and significantly related to cash flow 
volatility, growth opportunities, and profitability. Moreover, there is an expected positive and 
significant relationship between leverage and asset tangibility and firm size. However, the 
estimated co-efficient for non-debt tax shields was not significant, though it had the expected 
negative sign.  
Finally, the parameter estimates for some of the dummies for industry and year fixed effects 
were significant. For example, in the baseline model (Model 1), four of the year effects (for 1988, 
1993, 1999, and 2007) were statistically significant at conventional levels. Interestingly, these 
periods seem to coincide with some of the periods with the lowest Bank of England interest rate.9 
Specifically, average bank rates were lowest in 1987 and 1988 during the period 1980-1989. 
Similarly, between 1990-1999, the years with the lowest bank rate were 1993 and 1999. Thus, it 
seems that most of the years with statistically significant year effects had low levels of interest rate 
which could indicate capital availability in the macro-economy, which, in turn, led to increased 
                                                          
9
 See link: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/iadb/repo.asp  
21 
 
acquisition activities. The results for the industry and year fixed effects are not reported in order to 
conserve space. They are, however, available upon request. 
 
5. Conclusion and implications 
Using a dataset of UK non-financial publicly listed firms, this paper provides new empirical 
insights into the link between cross-border acquisitions and financial leverage. Drawing on the 
international business literature and a sample of cross-border and domestic acquisitions, the present 
paper examines how the decision by a firm to increase its international operations may impact its 
financial leverage in the context of a country with rising cross-border acquisitions. The findings 
indicate that relative to domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions (increasing levels of 
internationalisation), on average, result in declines (weakly significant) in DFTXLULQJILUPV¶GHEWXVDJH
However, the negative and significant cross-border impact on corporate leverage is primarily 
associated with acquirers that expand their operations into less developed economies, and those that do 
not have previous experience in foreign market operations (i.e. domestic corporations that become 
new entrants into foreign markets).  
7KHVWXG\¶V results have several important implications on both corporate theory and practice. 
First, the decline in the debt levels of cross-border acquirers suggests that lenders perceive increasing 
levels of internationalisation to be more risky and costly, thus, they are less willing to provide debt 
capital to firms that diversify internationally via mergers and acquisitions. Another plausible 
interpretation is that managers themselves perceive internationalisation strategy to be risky, and 
therefore attempt to limit corporate risk by avoiding debt financing. Both implications are inconsistent 
with the traditional view that international diversification reduces corporate risk because it offers an 
opportunity for the firm to diversify its cash flows from imperfectly correlated foreign markets (see 
Fatemi, 1984). Rather, the results support the view that international diversification is associated with 
higher risks and agency and information asymmetry costs (e.g. Burgman, 1996; Reeb et al., 1998). It 
is also possible that increasing levels of internationalisation is associated with both benefits and costs; 
however, the costs outweigh the benefits. Hence, the net effect of conducting business in a global 
environment (i.e. internationalisation) is a reduction in corporate debt usage.   
22 
 
6HFRQGWKHVWXG\¶VILQGLQJVimply that the increased complexities (risks and costs) associated 
with internationalisation is not symmetric for all cross-border deals and for all acquiring firms. It 
appears that the increased risks/costs of internationalisation is present only for those firms that choose 
to enter developing and less stable foreign markets, consistent with Kwok and Reeb (2000). 
Specifically, since leverage ratios do not significantly reduce following acquisitions with target firms 
from developed countries, it seems international firms that locate in developed countries do not face 
the general borrowing difficulties associated with internationalisation. However, thHFXUUHQWDUWLFOH¶V
findings imply that lenders may demand more compensation from corporate borrowers that operate in 
less stable global environments, which results in lower debt ratios for such firms. Collectively, it 
appears that the cost of doing business in a global context, in terms of debt usage, is asymmetrically 
higher in developing foreign markets than in developed foreign markets.  
Finally, the SDSHU¶VILQGLQJVVXJJHVWWKDWDILUP¶VH[SHULHQFHLQIRUHLJQPDUNHWVLVFUXFLDOLQ
managing the increased risks/costs associated with internationalisation. Lenders appear to be more 
willing to lend to international firms that increase their international operations than domestic firms 
that are new to foreign business. A more direct research approach to this issue is recommended. In 
particularIXWXUHUHVHDUFKFDQHPSOR\FRUSRUDWHERQGGDWDWRH[DPLQHOHQGHUV¶EHKDYLRXUWRZDUGV
firms with or without foreign market experience. Another promising area for research is how the other 
foreign market entry modes (e.g. greenfield investments, joint ventures, exporting, etc.) may impact 
corporate risks and leverage. 
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